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Abstract
The study’s aim is to analyze and investigate the characteristics of the regions demanding 
autonomy in Eastern Bolivia. Therefore the study takes a look at the Spanish political model, 
which could serve in a comparing and evaluating framework. The development of processes 
of autonomy has been part of Spanish history, especially in the regions of Catalonia and the 
Basque Country, which has contributed to the establishment of a stable democracy and a 
flourishing economy in Spain. Firstly, the study compares both autonomous regions in both 
countries out of a historical way. On the one hand, the reader will discover differences in the 
nationalist regions and on the other hand important similar developments in both countries. 
Finally, the study concludes that the Spanish State of Autonomies and its 1978 Constitution, 
established after Franco’s death, could serve as the right example for the Bolivian State. 
Essential in the article is the search for a consensus over the different characteristics which 
exist between the two ideologies which are the main reason why the Bolivian State could be 
described as a weak State. 
Resumen
El objetivo del estudio es analizar e indagar sobre las características de las autonomías en las 
regiones del este de Bolivia. Para tal efecto se analiza el modelo político español, el cual podría 
servir como un marco de comparación y evaluación.  En España el desarrollo de los procesos 
autonómicos ha sido parte de su historia, especialmente en las regiones de Cataluña y el País 
Vasco. Cabe resaltar que hoy en día España es una democracia estable con una economía 
dinámica. El estudio se enfoca en primera instancia hacia un estudio histórico y comparativo 10
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de  las  regiones    autonómicas  de  ambos  países.  Por  un  lado  el  lector  puede  encontrar 
diferencias regionales nacionalistas y por el otro importantes similitudes en el desarrollo de 
ambos países. El estudio concluye definiendo el motivo por el cual la España Autonómica y su 
Constitución de 1978, establecida después de la muerte de Franco, constituye un buen marco 
de comparación para el Estado Boliviano. El eje articulador del artículo es la búsqueda de un 
consenso sobre los criterios divergentes que existen entre las dos ideologías que provocan un 
Estado débil en Bolivia.
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Introduction 1. 
When Spanish conquistador Francisco Pizarro started his conquest over the Inca empire 
in 1532 he wouldn´t have thought that five centuries later an indigenous leader would rule 
over his descendants. Doubtful, as well, is if he would have realised what kind of turbulent 
future the land he conquered would face in the next centuries. One of the countries, which 
arose out of the land, Pizarro set foot on in the sixteenth century is now called Bolivia. It seems 
that, ever since independence in 1825, Bolivia has been in political turmoil. Today, Bolivia 
is a divided country, divided between ideologies. One of those ideologies makes regions 
demand autonomy. In Europe, Spain is one of the countries, which had a turbulent history 
with nationalist/regionalist regions, namely Catalonia and the Basque Country. Nevertheless, 
since the death of Franco in 1975 Spain has become a stable democracy. Reason for this is the 
establishment of the Spanish State of Autonomies and its 1978 Constitution. In this working 
paper I will argue why I believe Spain could function as a good example in solving one of 
the problems contemporary Bolivia has to deal with. The working paper is written out of a 
historical view to provide a better understanding of both countries.
Catalonia and the Basque Country  1.1. 
In this section I will give an overview of the history of nationalism in the Basque Country 
and Catalonia. On the one hand, there is a similarity in the emerge of Catalan and Basque 
nationalism, both emerged in the same phases of time. On the other hand one can see crucial 
differences in the creation of nationalistic feelings and the way people expressing them. Before 11
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comparing both kind of nationalism it is useful to understand what historical features made 
Catalan and Basque nationalism rise. In the second part of this section I will take a closer look 
to contemporary nationalism in Spain and how the ‘Estado de las Autonomías’ works.
History of Catalan nationalism before the Civil War 1.2. 
The history of Catalonia as a part of Spain starts at the beginning of the eighteenth century. 
In avoiding a possible unification of Spain and France under the House of Bourbon, and, 
thereby disturbing the European balance of power, the European powers fought the War of 
the Spanish Succession. After the victory of the new Spanish Bourbon dynasty, Spain emerged 
as a single united polity. For the first time in history Catalonia was fully integrated into the 
broader affairs of Spain. The beginning of the ninetheenth century brought Napoleon rule 
in a big part of Europe, as well as in Spain. Until the defeat of Napoleon in 1814 Catalans 
were as patriotic as other parts of Spain (Payne ,1971). In the period after the Third Carlist 
War Catalan nationalism starts to develop. During the period of 1833 to 1876 three civil wars 
were fought in Spain, between the Carlists and the Liberals, later Federalists. After the death 
of Ferdinand VII, his wife María Christina became queen regent on behalf of Ferdinand’s 
and María Christina’s infant child Isabella II. The Carlists supported Carlos, later Carlos V, 
brother of Ferdinand and pretender of the crown. The fighting parties ideologies were Spanish 
traditionalism versus liberalism. The first sign of a rising Catalan self-consciousness was the 
first publication of a regular newspaper in Catalan ever, ‘El Diari Català’ founded by the father 
of Catalan nationalism, Valentí Almirall (Payne ,1971). 
The publication was within the Catalan ‘modernisme’ movement, which most well-known 
representer was Gaudí. “This replaced the nostalgic focus on Catalonia’s traditional language 
and culture with a celebration of modernity, progress and cosmopolitanism” (Edles,1999). 
Catalan modernisme was a reaction to “the rebirth of Catalan vernacular literature, commonly 
referred to as the ‘renaixença’. Its roots may be traced to the 1830s and were part of the general 
awakening of Romantic cultural nationalism and regionalism found in widely scatterd parts 
of Europe” (Payne ,1971). Catalan modernisme was also witness of the establishment of 
the first specific ideologue of Catalanism, after the formation of a fusion party named ‘Unió 
Catalanista’ (Payne ,1971). Leader of the first, to Catalan ideology linked, party was Enric Prat 
de la Riba. “As a conservative Catholic he combined an emphasis on industrial progress and 
legalism with an expressly patriarchal model of social organization” (Edles,1999). Moreover, 
“he defined Spain as the political state and Catalonia as the true fatherland of Catalans. (…) 12
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Catalan nationalism was not seperatist but demanded a regional parliament and government 
and a fully autonomous regional administrative system” (Payne, 1991).
After  emperial  loses  throughout  the  nineteenth  century,  as  a  consequence  of  the 
achievement of independency by the Latin American countries, Spain lost its last colonies, 
Cuba, Costa Rica and the Philippines, to the United States, in the, for the Spanish state, 
disastrous year 1898. 
The state’s low prestige after the loss (…) and its inability to facilitate economic development 
throughout Spain, it’s inability to guarantee order and to promote industrial development in Cata-
lonia, and its threat to Catalan cultural and juridical institutions were the major reasons that natio-
nalist leaders gave to justify their nationalism (Medrano,1994).
The relation between Catalonia and the Spanish state depended heavily on economic 
conditions through history. The first example of this were the consequences for both Spain 
and  Catalonia  after  the  achievement  of  independence  by  the  Latin  American  colonies. 
It worsened the state of Spain’s public finances. Solution brought by the government were 
centralization measures and these policies asked most of the two particular and economically 
most developed parts of the state: Catalonia and the Basque Country. In his article “Patterns 
of Development and Nationalism: Basque and Catalan Nationalism before the Spanish Civil 
War”, Juan Diez Medrano gives a helpful survey of how Catalonia, together with the Basque 
Country, became economically the leading part of Spain. Catalonia’s economic development 
was the product of on the one hand its agrarian development and on the other its full integration 
into the Spanish state after the War of Spanish Succession which I mentioned earlier. By the half 
on the nineteenth century, the textile industry was the backstone of Catalan industrialization. 
However, the growth potential of the textile sector was limited because of the small size of the 
Spanish market and high production costs. “Consequently, the Catalan capitalist sector came 
to depend on protectionist legislation enacted by the Spanish government” (Medrano,1994). 
This economic dependence could provide as an explanation why the first political Catalan 
ideology defined Catalan nationalism not as sepetarist but demanded autonomy. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century the Lliga Regionalista was founded, a fusion 
party of the Centre Nacional Català and Unió Regionalista. This party would dominate 
Catalan politics from this period until the Civil War. Moreover, “in the first quarter of the 
twentieth century Catalonia occupied the forefront of Spanish politics” (Payne ,1971). Spanish 13
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society, after the debacle of 1898, demanded for ‘Regeneration’. This wish was represented by 
the ‘Generation of ‘98’, a group of writers and philosophers opposing the Restoration of the 
monarchy and who had a traditionalist view. Out of ‘Regenerationism’ emerged a reformist 
Conservative government who made provincial decentralization one of its major goals. This 
gave a major boost to Catalan nationalism. Especially after the establishment of the Catalan 
Mancomunitat in 1914, which was a unification of provincial administration of the four 
Catalan provinces. 
Spain was not involved in the Second World War. However, the end of the war affected 
Spain almost as much as the other European countries economically, while the beginning 
of the War had given an economic impetus to Catalonia. Because of this economic growth 
a lot of immigrant workers moved to, especially, Barcelona in search of work. Most of the 
immigrants were illiterate and had to work in bad conditions. Demanding better terms of 
employment the biggest Spanish labour syndicate launched a period of enourmos strikes, 
“soon degenerating in a terrorist class struggle that lasted for four years and cut the ground 
from under the feet of Catalanism in Catalonia itself. The result was an almost permanent state 
of martial law and increasing reliance by Catalan economic interest on the police authority of 
the Spanish state”(Payne ,1971). Laura Desfor Edles even speaks of ‘two wars that were going 
on in Catalonia in the first two decades of the twentieth century: nationalist struggle against 
the government in Madrid and a class struggle which pitted rich against poor” (Edles, 1999).
Anarchism in Barcelona turned out be an important reason for Primo de Rivera taking 
power in 1923. The Lliga Regionalista lost its power over Catalan politics during the ‘state of 
anarchism’ to left and republican groups, therefore it collaborated with Primo de Rivera when 
he overthrew the parliamentary regime and set up a military dictatorship. Besides the Lliga, 
the middle an upper class Catalans saw him as the leader who could restore order and stop the 
anarchistic chaos. It is doubtful if this was a wise thing to do while Primo de Rivera “a week after 
he seized power began to suppress all manifestations of Catalanism” (Edles, 1999). Ultimately, 
he dissolved the Catalan Mancomunitat in 1924. The dictatorship meant a recoil for Catalan 
nationalism.  The  Lliga  Regionalista  did  not  oppose  Primo  de  Rivera’s  rule,  progressive 
nationalistic parties did. Consequence was, that, when democratic rule was restored, leftist 
groups, collaborated with progressive nationalists. Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship ended in 
1930, after the military made clear they did not longer support him.
The period between April 1931 and April 1939 is known as the Second Republic. 
After Primo de Rivera’s resignation municipal elections were held. In Catalonia, Esquerra 14
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Republicana emerged as the undisputable victor. Their program clearly reflected by nationalist 
and reformist goals. 
One day after the elections, Maciá, the president of Esquerra, proclaimed the Catalan Republic, but 
soon was convinced by Spanish republican leaders to settle for a less ambitious compromise that 
kept Catalonia a part of Spain. This compromise consisted of the symbolic re-establishment of the 
Generalitat, a Catalan medieval governing body, while negotiations took place for the approval of a 
Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia (Medrano,1994).
The Statute was finally obtained in 1932, it “provided for a fully autonomous government 
with  an  executive,  parliament,  and  police  powers  of  its  own,  exercizing  administrative 
sovereignty  over  nearly  all  internal  affairs”  (Payne,1971).  The  Second  Republic  can  be 
characterised by two marks. Firstly, the Republic showed a liberal and very human face 
in international relations. It was the opposite of authoritarianism and “was always on the 
side of the peaceful resolution of disputes and of the rights of smaller an weaker countries” 
(Payne,1991). Secondly, the Republic responded to the Catalan demand for more autonomy. 
It knew that without recogonizing Catalanist demands achieving a stable state would be a 
difficult job.
“The difference between Basque and Catalan nationalists is that Basques want to leave 
Spain, and Catalans want to run it” (Edles,1999).
History of Basque nationalism before the Civil War 1.3. 
There are two reasons why the Basque Country can be considered as a special part of 
Spain. Special, because of the origin of the Basque people and special because of its position 
within the Spanish state. Firstly, according to linguistic scientists, Basque is the oldest language 
of Europe. It is not part of the dominant Indo-European or Finno-Ugric language families. 
Until now no scholar was able to find a relationship between Basque and another European 
language. Some suspected that Basque could be related to Eutruskian, others tried to link it 
to languages in the Kaukas, for example Georgian. Reason for this authenticity is the isolated 
location of the Basque Country in the Pyrenees. Other ‘authentic’ languages such as in, 
Hungary, some Indonesian and  Kaukasian areas cannot be related to other language families 
neither, also because of its isolated locations.15
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The second reason why the Basque people have been a special case during the history of 
the Spanish state was the policy of the Basque ‘fueros’. “The three Basque provinces of Vizcaya, 
Guipuzcoa and Alava had been formally incorporated into the kingdom of Castile during the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries on the basis of regional fueros” (Payne,1971). Fueros were 
local laws and privileges and gave the Basque people the right to organize from within the 
community, or in other words, political autonomous institutions. This meant, for example, 
that Basques could decide the quotas of their own taxes. The bombing of Guernica, after 
Franco’s deal with Hitler, on 26 April 1937, therefore was not only a violation of human rights, 
“it was the first total destruction of an undefended civilian target by aerial bombardment ever” 
(Edles,1999). Moreover it was a symbolic destruction of everything that was left of Basque 
autonomy at that time. The tree of Guernica symbolized the Basque fueros, while it was the 
place to meet for the heads of the Basque villages to discuss Basque politics, it symbolised 
“liberty for all the Basque peoples” (Edles ,1999).
Together with the rural areas of Catalonia, the Basque Country had been the stronghold 
of Carlism during the three Carlist wars. The year 1876, with the end of the third Carlist 
war is a crucial date in the development of Basque nationalism for two reasons: on the one 
hand, the few national leaders of that time favoured traditionalism and conservatism with 
an important role for the Catholic Church. They were what Carlism stood for, anti-liberal, 
and, thus conservative. On the other hand meant the loss of the war, the loss of the fueros. 
The new government made an agreement with the Basques to change the fueros for the so-
called ‘Conciertos Económicos’. Although the conciertos económicos were not a bad deal 
comparing taxes in other parts of Spain, it was a sign that the Basque financial political rights 
were no longer untouchable. 
“In 1893, the Spanish government tried to raise Basque tax quotas, which were still set at 
the very modest levels of 1841” (Payne,1971). The reaction of the Basque people was a violent 
demonstration and in the same year the first Basque nationalist organization was founded. 
This organisation later turned into the ‘Partido Nacionalista Vasco’ (PNV). The PNV still is 
today’s leading nationalist Basque party. “In contrast to Catalan nationalism, which emerged in 
the context of a preexisting cultural and linguistic revival, Basque nationalism emerged almost 
singlehandedly through the efforts of Sabino de Arana y Goiri, who created the very concept 
of the Basque nation” (Eddles,1999).  Arana started to study Basque language and history 
when he lived in Barcelona, inspired by emerging Catalan nationalism. Back in the Basque 
Country he wrote the first book on Basque grammar ever. 16
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‘Arana’s nationalism, which dominated Basque nationalist discourse until the Spanish 
Civil War, was a defensive reaction against what he saw as the harmful influence of liberalism 
in Basque society. Through his articles one can see clearly delineated a political program 
essentially  informed  by  religious  concerns.  Arana  presented  his  struggle  for  Basque 
independence as a struggle for the religious salvation of the Basque race through complete 
isolation from other peoples, especially Spaniards. In his view, language was as much a shield 
against change as political independence. Similarly, Arana hated Spanish immigrants because 
they were important agents of change in the traditions and culture of the Basque country, 
they represented more secular views than the ones prevailing among the Basque population, 
and they generally supported the Socialist party, instead of adhering to a ‘religiously founded’ 
system of paternalistic relations between employer and worker’ (Medrano ,1994).
Although  he  was  inspired  by  Catalan  nationalism,  “Arana  publicly  denounced  what 
he termed the ‘catalanist error’ of seeking autonomy and co-operation within the Spanish 
framework, insisting that the Basque movement demanded total separation” (Payne,1991). In 
short, his view was very religiuos, racial based, he was more concerned of changes introduced 
in the Basque Country than economic factors and he was a separatist. The PNV, with Arana as 
its representer, first entered electoral politics in Spain’s disastrous year of 1898.
Still, Basque nationalism was not emerging with the same speed as Catalan nationalism, 
because of economic reasons. As mentioned before, the few, Basque nationalist leaders before 
Arana, were, like Arana, very conservative. This in contrast to the Basque capitalist elite who 
supported liberalism in the Carlist wars and were not nationalistic. The two different ideologic 
views stood for the economic differences in Basque society. In “Patterns of Development and 
Nationalism: Basque and Catalan Nationalism before the Spanish Civil War”, Juan Diez 
Medrano reproduces the development of the Basque economy since 1800. “In 1800, the 
Basque Country was one of the poorest regions of Spain (…) Between 1800 and 1860 the 
Basque Country’s GDP increased faster than that of any other region except for Madrid and 
Catalonia”, because of iron production and the privatization of mining. 
Unlike development in Catalonia (…) development in the Basque Country was uneven. (…) 
Development in commerce and industry took place despite crises in the agricultural sector and 
even at the expense of agriculture (…) The discovery in 1856 of the Bessemer process for the 
production of steel by the ‘direct method’ revolutionized the iron industry (…) this resulted in a 
spectacular rise in iron ore exports. (…) This industry, like Catalan industry, needed protection 17
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because lack of a cheap source of coal made Basque industrial products too expensive to compete 
in foreign markets. (…) The negative side of this spectacular industrial revolution was that it had 
highly dislocating effects on Basque society and benefitted only a very small group within the com-
mercial and landowning elites (Medrano,1994).
With an upper economic class satisfied with Spanish governement policies and a part of 
the lower economic class demanding separatism, Basque nationalism made little progress 
until the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. Beside economic differences another weakness of 
that time was the narrowness of Basque culture. Only a few people spoke ‘Euskara’, or the 
Basque language, combined with the higly traditionalist nature of the nationalists. Where the 
Catalan nationalists achieved to get the Catalan Statute of Autonomy approved in 1923, the 
Basques did not. On the one hand this was a reaffirmation of the relative weakness of Basque 
nationalism comparing to Catalan nationalism. On the other hand it was a stimulation for the 
Basques to get their own Statute of Autonomy. This could be a reason why Basque nationalism 
became stronger during the Second Republic. In the first Republican municipal elections the 
PNV won a majority of seats. Another reason for the growing popularity of the PNV can be 
found in increased economic independence in the rural areas, “which freed them from the 
political hold of small Carlist landlords” (Medrano,1994). Basques nationalists got the Statute 
of Autonomy finally approved in October 1936. Unfortunately for them, and for many more 
Spaniards, the Spanish Civil War had already begun. 
The dialectic process of the Franco regime 1.4. 
Catalan and Basque nationalism could relatively flourish well during the Second Republic. 
Three important powers emerged to the nationalist reaction: “the revival of neo-traditionalism, 
the  creation  of  a  new  radical  right  authoritarianism  and  the  generic  fascist  nationalism 
of Falange” (Payne,1991). A new right was created with two main characteristics: anti-
regionalistic, because this would undermine the unity of the Spanish state, and authoritarian, 
against the liberal and, in the right its view, weak policies of the Second Republic. During 
the Spanish Civil War this radical right became known as the Nationalists, supported by the 
broadest part of the Catholic Church, the Carlist groups, Falange Española and other neo-
traditionalist groups. Falange Española was founded by the son of Spain’s old dictator Primo 
de Rivera and had a lot of characteristics of fascism. The war started after a ‘coup d’état’ by a 
group of generals supported by the right powers. The Republican government could stop the 18
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first coup. However, the insurrection of general Franco in July of 1936 truly meant war. The 
insurrection came against a background of several months of social unrest. When the coup 
began the government was paralyzed because it had to choose between the threats of workers 
who were arming themselves in the major cities, and, Franco. The Nationalist were supported 
by the, then, Fascist state of Italy, Nazi-Germany and neighbour Portugal. The Republicans 
achieved support from the Soviet Union and Mexico. This gave Franco’s Nationalist three 
reason to fight for. Firstly, there was the threat of  the Spanish state falling apart state because 
of the increased amount of freedom of movement for the nationalist movements in the 
Basque Country and Catalonia. Secondly, the months before the start of the war were of great 
social unrest, strikes, battles between civilians and the police. Or, to put it in other words, an 
anarchistic atmosphere. Thirdly, because the Soviet Union supported the Republicans, Spain 
could turn into a communist state in the case the Repulicans would win the Civil War. By his 
supporters Franco was considered as the one who saved Spain from falling apart, a state of 
anarchism or of becoming a communist state. 
On 1 April 1939 Franco overthrew the Republican government. After the War there were 
harsh reprisals against Franco’s former enemies. “Historians continue to argue over the full 
scale of Franco’s repressive machinery. Lower estimates talk of 30,000 opponents shot by 
Franco’s firing squads after the civil war, with a further 50,000 to 100,000 executed during the 
war”1.
The impact of Franco’s victory was marked in both Catalonia and the Basque Country, entailing 
not only the suppression of all autonomous political institutions and laws but the prohibition of 
the Basque and Catalan languages and cultures as well as symbols of sub-state identity such as flags 
and anthems (Guibernau,2000).
Before he won the Civil War in 1939, Franco abolished Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy 
by a decree of 5 april 1938. It lasted more than ten years before Catalan and Basques resistance 
grew against the dictatorship of Franco. In the 1950s Franco introduced capitalism which 
opened up Spain to the symbols, norms, and institutions of modern, Western European 
democracy. “Over the same course of time, the liberalization of the Church lay people to veer 
away from the mentality of the Cruzada and toward the spirit of moderation, reconciliation, 
and political and religious tolerance” (Edles ,1999). One can conclude that in the Franco 
period, Catalan nationalism was less violent than Basque nationalism. A reason could be 
1  http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/dec/01/spain.gilestremlett/print <23-03-2009> 19
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that during history Catalan politics has participated more in Spanish politics than its Basque 
equivalent. Therefore Catalan nationalism was not based on violence but on “an impressive 
underground network of civic and cultural associations developed in the 1950s and thrived in 
the 1960s and early 1970s as the dictatorship was weakening” (Lecours ,2001).
Basque nationalism was different. Its founding father, Arana,
“promoted the idea of Euskadi as a country occupied by a foreign power. The Francoist regime, with 
its obsession to root out all symbols of Basque culture, merely gave plausibilty to Arana’s theory of 
alien occupation. Beside that, ‘the profound social and economic transformations which affected 
the Basque Country in the 1950s brought an uncontrolled industrial expansion around the main 
Basque cities and a large inflow of Castilian speaking immigrants from other parts of Spain. The 
Castilian language is often referred to as Spanish, a fact that reflects the dominance over the other 
parts of Spain. Meanwhile, both the Basque language and its culture suffered erosion. This encoura-
ged both the rejection of Castilian culture and hostility to immigrants’. (Guibernau,2000) Against 
this background ATA was founded in 1952, which changed its name to ETA in 1959. ATA ‘was 
discarded when the founders discovered that in one Basque dialect, ata means duck’ (Shepard, 
2000).
In the begin years of ETA, parts of the Basque and Spanish public could understand 
ETA’s actions. ETA was seen as a liberation movement trying to free the Basque people from 
a country that would not allow it to express its culture or speak its own language, therefore, 
patriotic action instead of terrorism as its seen today. In the 1960s ETA was “composed of 
an uncomfortable mix of nationalists and socialists, students and labor activists, and rural 
Catholic youth” (Eddles, 1999). The first ETA killings found place in 1968, at a checkpoint a 
civil guard was shot. Before that time it contributed to the cultural and linguistic movement 
of the 1960s which had the standarize of Euskara as a consequence. ETA’s most important 
killing in its history took place in 1973. In this year it blew up the car of Franco’s expected 
successor and prime minister at that time, Carrero Blanco. “The killing of Blanco was part 
of ETA’s action-repression spiral theory. According to this theory attacks on the Francoist 
state would lead to a blatant, universal repression, which would lead to greater popular 
anger, which would spiral into mass rebellion and eventually civil war and Basque secession” 
(Eddles, 1999). In 1974 ETA showed for the first time more characteristics of a terrorist 
organisation than of a liberation movement. In Madrid it killed twelve persons in a brutal café 
bombing. The bombing was a reason for part of the ETA members to split off from the café 20
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attackers. ETA split into a political-military and a military faction. The military faction declared 
itself a Marxist organisation.
It may seem that the whole Basque Country supported the strategies of the nationalists. 
However, this was not the case. A smart move of Franco, to frustrate the nationalisation 
movement was to allow the, during history close to the Basque Country related, provinces of 
Alava and Navarra to retain certain special privileges in recognition for their support during 
the war. Moreover he appointed loyal Basque elites to important political positions. Within 
Catalonia, one could also see a division between supporters and opponents of Franco. The 
part of Catalan society which strived for the preservation of Catalan culture and language 
was supported by sectors of the Catholic Church and universities throughout Catalonia 
(Guibernau,2000). Some parts of the Catholic Church supported Franco during the Civil 
War and his regime. However, in Catalonia 
some sectors of the Catalan Church assumed a crucial role by preaching and teaching religion in 
Catalan and employing it as an instrument of culture and communication. (…) The University 
Front of Catalonia combined people from different backgrounds. It advocated the reconstruction 
of Catalonia and produced a critical account of pre-war Catalan politics (Guibernau,2000).
Franco’s policies of undermining Catalan and Basque culture can be seen as a school 
example of a Hegelian dialectical process. The Franco regime used a violent strategy to 
suppress nationalistic feelings in Catalonia and the Basque Country. His intention was to 
exterminate those feelings. At the time of his death in 1975, Catalan, and in a bigger amount, 
Basque nationalistic feelings were more intens than ever, and we can conclude that Franco’s 
policies were counterproductive. The most important reason for this is that during the 
dictatorship nationalism became a synonym for democracy and therefore found support at 
a wider public. 
The violence deployed by Franco against cultural distictiveness gave these identities new creditbility 
by conflating the ideas of Spanish identity and authoritarianism, nationalism/regionalism became 
a form of resistance policies interwined with human rights, democracy and progressive activism. 
This conceptual connection was also a practical one as pro-democracy and human rights groups 
in Catalonia and the Basque provinces tended to be nationalist and vice versa. Consequently, re-
pression brought not only claims for democratisation but also demands for cultural expression, 
symbolic recognition of regional identities/communities and political autonomy that had found 
both new legitimacy and networks (Lecours,2001). 21
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Transition to democracy 1.5. 
After the death of Franco, the lack of a political leader forced Spanish society to establish 
a new form of government. At the end of the Franco regime nationalism in three regions of 
Spanish society, Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, stood for democracy. One thing 
was clear for the majority of the Spaniards: Civil War must never be repeated again. Because 
of this sentiment ‘consensus’ was almost something sacred. But, finding consensus in a former 
centralist country, in which some parts did not want to be fully incorporated in the country 
was not an easy task. This was Franco’s legacy to the founders of the new Spanish Constitution 
formed in 1978. 
First sign of the goodwill of Spanish society in achieving a form of consensus between the 
regions that considered themselves as nations within the Spanish state and the government 
was the recovery of the Catalan State of Autonomy in 1977. The recovery was a consequence 
of so-called ‘soldarity actions’ in Catalonia.
A solidarity action is an action that is usually instilled by a small elite but whose aim is to attain mass 
mobilization. The objective is to show the opposition its strenght by focusing upon a particular 
demand and presenting it as an undeniable due to the massive support is receives (Guibernau, 
2000)
In the first year of transition there were many solidarity actions in Spain in the form of mass 
demonstrations, a good example of such an action was a mass demonstration in Barcelona of 
one million people demanding the recovery of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy, abolished by 
Franco at the end of the Civil War.  
In 1978 first democratic elections took place, “the outcome was that for the first time, the 
Constitution was not the consequence of the exclusive product of one dominant political 
tendency” (Guibernau, 2000b). The Constitution makes a difference between three ‘historical 
nationalities’ and the other, fourteen, autonomous regions. The historical nationalities were 
immediately allowed to practice a degree of ‘full autonomy’, the other regions had to undergo 
a five-year period of ‘restricted autonomy’ before doing so. But, once full autonomy has been 
achieved, the Constitution makes no distinction between the communities. The slogan of 
the one’s formulating the Constitution was ‘café para todos’, in order to approach the different 
sentiments in Spain, and creating the ‘Estado de las Autonomías’. In this context Catalonia, 
the Basque Country and Galicia were referred to as historical nationalities. Beside nations, the 22
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Spanish state is made up of regions and therefore has a pluri-ethnic composition. Important 
in the Constitution is Article 2 where the Constitution “recognizes and guarantees the right to 
autonomy of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed, and the solidarity amongst 
them” (Moreno, 1997).
In “Spain: Catalonia and the Basque Country”, Guibernau makes perfectly clear how the 
Spanish state of the Autonomies works: all communities are similarly structured: each has 
a regional legislative assembly consisting of a single chamber; deputies are elected on the 
basis of proportional representation, and the leader of the majority party or coalition usually 
assumes the Community presidency. The president heads a regional executive-ministers 
run administrive departments which, for the most part, though not in every case, follow the 
pattern of central government, depending on how much power is devolved to the respective 
autonomous community. In many respects the Autonomous Governments operate as states 
with regard to their developed competencies. The Catalan and Basque governments provide 
wide-ranging public services such as education, health service and local transport. They even 
control their own autonomous police force which coexists with the Spanish National Police 
and Guardia Civil. The powers reserved to the central government are as follows: exclusive 
jurisdiction over defence, the administration of justice, international relations and general 
economic planning. 
The Constitution does not define Spain as a federalist state. Spain can be considered a 
special case because of its assymetrical model, assymetrical because some autonomies have 
more competencies than others. The pluri-ethnic and assymetrical characteristics are the 
consequence of the atmosphere of consensus in the beginning of the transition period. 
In fact, two different conceptions of Spain, which had traditionally confronted each other, were for-
mulated. Subsequently, a middle way was negotiated and explicitly recognized by the Constitution: 
the idea of an indivisble and solely Spanish nation-state, and, a concept of Spain as an ensemble of 
diverse peoples, historic nations, and regions (Moreno, 1997)
The reason why the Constitution cannot be considered as ‘federal’ is because of the 
principle of ‘interterritorial solidarity’ and explains the necessity to guarantee the integration 
and interrelation of the Spanish nationalities and regions. “From a more mundane point of 
view, the principle refers to the transfer of funds from the richer autonomous communities to 
the poorer, with the aim of attaining a minimum level of basic services state-wide with a fair 
and adequate distribution of the financial burden” (Moreno, 1997). The principle is elaborated 23
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in two articles of the Constitution: Article 130 explains that the Constitution’s ultimate aim 
is obtaining the same standard of living for all Spaniards. Moreover, Article 138 tells us that 
the state should guarantee the effective application of the solidarity principle through seeking 
an economic balance among the regions (Moreno, 1997). Thus, the Spanish Constitution 
of 1978 provided on the one hand a lot of political freedom for ‘historical nationalities’ like 
Catalonia and the Basque Country. On the other hand it strived for a Spanish state for all, 
based on the principle of solidarity. What was the reaction of the different Spanish regions and 
nations in the first years after transition towards democracy?
The Basques weren’t as happy with the Constitution as the Catalans were. In Catalonia 
more than ninety percent voted in favor of the Constitution in the referendum held over it. 
This was a higher percentage than in the rest of Spain. Although the Basque people agreed with 
the Constitution it was not with such an enthusiasm as the Catalans showed. Argument, for 
most Basque nationalists, was “that the new Constitution was ambiguous about Basque rights. 
The Basque Statute of Autonomy was, however, ratified by referendum” (Guibernau, 2000b) 
in 1979. Since the Constitution, the Basque Parliament has been in the hands of those who 
favor to create a separate Basque nation through peaceful means. There have been two ruling 
parties since Spain’s transition to democracy: the PNV, which has a position in the middle. 
It is viewed by the PP (one of the two biggest national parties, the other is the PSOE) as soft on 
ETA. At the same time it is scorned by Euskal Herritarok (the party’s former name was Herri Ba-
tasuna), an independent party thought to be the political arm of  ETA, as no better than the anti-
independence PP (Shepard, 2002). 
In the Franco period the ETA had a reason to exist, it thought it could liberate the Basque 
Country from a suppressing state, and therefore also had legitimacy to exist. In the transition 
period this legitimacy became weaker, after all, the Basque Country was part of a democratic 
country to which the Basque peoples gave its approvement, through a referendum, to rule over 
them. Then there was the GAL case in the period 1983 to 1987 which gave ETA much of its 
legitimacy back. GAL stands for ‘Grupo Antiterrorista de Liberación’ and was a paramilitary 
group which worked in order of the Spanish department of Internal Affairs. The French part of 
the Basque Country had been a safeheaven for ETA members for years, 
there seemed to be an unspoken and uneasy pact. There would be no violence committed by the 
Basque nationalists in France, and French authorities would not arrest Basques who committed 24
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terrorist crimes in Spain, or permit their extradition. That silent devil’s bargain began to come apart 
during the second Mitterand presidency. After all, there was a follow socialist prime minister of 
Spain, Felipe Gonzalez (Shepard, 2002).
The activities of the GAL started with the kidnapping of a man named Segundo Marey 
in the French region of the Basque Country. Four years later the GAL had killed twenty-
seven persons, of whom at least nine had no connections with ETA. Gonzalez never publicly 
admitted knowing about the existence of the GAL, neither he ever publicly distanced himself 
from the group. 
The Spanish interior minister for the Gonzalez government during this period, Barrionuevo, the 
secretary of state for security, Vera, and the civil governor of Vizcaya, Sancristobal, were convicted 
in 1998 and sentenced to prison for ten years each for their illegal activities in connection with the 
Marey kidnapping (Shepard, 2002).
One can conclude that the violent section of the Basque nationalist movement became 
more radical and found another justification for its actions. The political and more peaceful 
section of Basque nationalism produced a critical change in Basque political discourse through 
the ‘Pacto de Ajuria Enea’. The pact was signed by all the Basque parties beside Herri Batasuna 
(after its name change, later, Euskal Herritarok) and committed the parties to end terrorism. 
A reason for the pact could be the changing attitude of Basque public opinion considering 
Basque nationalism and the use of violence. A growing number of the Basque people thought 
of violence as a useless tool in achieving political success. A slogan supported by more and 
more Basques was and is “Nationalism, Yes- ETA, No” (Edles, 1999). This sense under the 
Basque people became stronger after the murder of Miguel Angel Blanco committed by ETA 
in 1997. Blanco was a local politician for the Partido Popular when he was kidnapped by  ETA. 
ETA demanded a transfer of all imprisoned ETA members to Basque jails within fourty-eight 
hours after the kidnapping, if not, ETA threatened to kill him. Hours before the ultimatum 
expired one of the biggest demonstrations in Spanish history took place demanding the 
freedom of Angel Blanco. ETA ignored the protesters call for Angel Blanco’s freedom and shot 
him in the head after the ultimatum expired. This murder made a lot of Spaniards realise the 
meaninglessness of the ETA violence.
The reason why such a high percentage of Catalans voted ‘yes’ in the referendum held 
over the 1978 Constitution could be, that, the almost sacred notion of consensus arised in 
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nationalism was no longer a sentiment of a small group, but rather a mass movement. During 
the last decade of the Franco regime, Catalan culture became popular again and contributed in 
closing the gap between the elites and the mass. Beside that, the Assembly of Catalonia played 
an important role in connecting Catalan nationalism with democracy. It supported political 
prisoners and exiles, had connections with human rights groups and played a big role in the 
coordination of the peoples fighting for democracy (Guibernau, 2000a). The renaissance 
of Catalan culture and the role of the Assembly made the solidarity actions possible which 
I mentioned before. Moreover, this shows a big difference between Catalan and Basque 
nationalism during the transition. In the case of the Basques, nationalism was a synonym for 
blood and violence. Blood and violence for a case not even the majority of the Basque people 
supported. In a way, one can conclude, that the Basques who were finally saved from the fear 
of the Franco dictatorship needed to fear another kind of violence: that of their own people, 
proclaiming to be fighting in favor of them. Catalan nationalism developed in a total different 
way. Catalonia had its own separatist group fighting for the independence of the ‘Catalan 
Countries’, Terra Lluire. Although, it was recognised by the Spanish government as a terrorist 
group, in the period 1979 until the ending of Terra Lliure in 1991, it had less impact than ETA. 
In the period it committed one, accidental, murder and its actions were not as bloody as the 
one’s committed by ETA. Two main characteristics made Catalan nationalism different from 
its Basque variant. Firstly, it was supported by the majority of the Catalan people. Secondly, the 
way of trying to achieve its nationalists goals were through a political way. With political in this 
context I mean, through talk, through negotiating and, thus, through consensus. 
Catalan arguments for further autonomy can be divided into two groups, the rational and 
emotional arguments as Guibernau explains in his article “Nationalism and Intellectuals in 
Nations Without States: the Catalan Case”. Summarizing the rational arguments Catalans 
argue that their 
contribution to the Spanish coffers heavily outweights the income it receives from the central go-
vernment. This is presented as an unjust situation which, if reversed, would automatically increase 
the Generalitat´s spending power and improve the Catalan´s quality of life. Moreover, they think 
that political decentralization tends to strengthen democracy in as much as it brings decision-
making processes closer to the people. Regional politicians usually have greater awareness of the 
needs and aspirations of their eloctorates, thus the argument follows, greater devolved powers for 
Catalonia would strenghten Spanish democracy and encourage greater democratic participation 
within the region.26
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The last rational argument runs that 
the devolution of powers to regional institutions requires the re-allocation of resources to facilita-
te discrete policies and regional budget planning. These processes, in turn, contribute to revitalize 
civil society, encouraging local and regional initiatives that include cultural, economic and social 
projects.
Emotional  arguments  concern  historical  and  indentity  arguments.  Fresh  in  Catalan 
society’s memory is the Franco dictatorship, these memories “are connected with a long list 
of grievances, most of them concerned with repeated Spanish attempts to erradicate Catalan 
language, culture and political institutions”. Than there is the question of Catalan territory, 
a substantial number of people refers to the so called ‘Països Catalans’ including Catalonia, Valencia, 
the Balearic Islands and territories across the Pyrenees on the French side of the border. They justify 
their claim by stressing that these territories share a common liguistic and cultural background.
The last argument refers to Catalan identity which “are often portrayed as parts of a corpus 
of Catalan high culture which has received international recognition”. These are Catalan artists 
such as Miró, Gaudí and Dalí on the one hand and the proud of Barcelona, FC Barcelona, on 
the other hand. 
An  interesting  third  group  to  take  a  look  at  are  the  regions,  that,  because  of  the 
establishment of the ‘Estado de las Autonomías’ are the product of invention or are part of 
a mimesis effect. Because of the assymetrical model of the Spanish state, in which the three 
historical  nationalities  had  more  cempetencies  from  the  beginning  of  the  transition  to 
democracy, there are regions who are imitating the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia. 
In a way they are copying, or to use the Greek term ‘mimesis’, the three nations in Spain, and 
thus inventing traditions and identity. The domino effect created by the 1978 Constitution 
make other communities articulate a similar regional identity in order to achieve the same 
competencies. We can conclude that this is an unwanted consquence of the founders of the 
Constitution. As I stressed out before, the Constitution’s ultimate goal would be an equal 
Spanish state. By providing more autonomy to one region than to the other, the Constitution 
created an atmosphere of competition between the communities (Lecours, 2001) more than 
an atmosphere of solidarity and cooperation.27
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Contemporary nationalism in Spain  1.6. 
In both the Basque Country and Catalonia two parties have been dominant in regional 
politics since the transition to democracy. The PNV in the Basque Country and Convergència 
I Unió (CiU) in Catalonia. Both parties promote the nation’s culture and language with 
succes. Especially in Catalonia, Catalan is by far the most used language. It is not exaggerated 
to predict that if the English language ever emerges as the lingua franca in the European Union, 
the Castilian language will disappear out of Catalan society. 
The Basques and Catalans are not satisfied with their political position in the Spanish 
state yet. An overview of events related to Basque or Catalan nationalism can underline this 
statement. In the first place there is the, still existing, ETA. After the Angel Blanco murder 
Basque politics, part because of public pressure, and with the exception of Euskal Herritarok, 
distanced itself from everything that had to do with ETA, with the PNV denouncing the 
organisation as illegal. The combination of political attacks and public pressure, in the form of 
huge demonstrations, made ETA decide to declare a truce in September 1998. There where 
even talks between ETA and the Aznar government during the truce. After the first round it 
became clear that the talks had to fail. ETA intended to discuss Basque independence while 
the government only wanted to talk about ETA’s disarmament. This failure was a reason for 
ETA to end the truce fourteen months later. Another setback for ETA was the victory of the, 
by ETA hated, Partido Popular in the 2001 Basque regional elections. Another confirmation 
that ETA was not acting according to the will of the majority of the Basque people. In 
the same year ETA wanted to start talking again. It stated “that it would stop fighting if its 
maximum demand was met: that Spain must hold a referendum on Basque independence” 
(Shepard, 2002). Looking back it was not the best time to demand such things, a few weeks 
after 9/11 in which the universal hunt on terrorist had began. Therefore, the president at that 
time, Aznar, “refused, saying that the 11 September attacks showed that it was ‘suicide’ to deal 
with terrorists. ‘They must be defeated, he said, because the only aim of killers and fanatics is 
to kill and exclude those who don’t think as they do’. And so the stage was set for violence to 
continue” (Shepard, 2002). 
9/11 would prescribe the first decade of the twenty-first century for Spain. In the aftermath 
of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center the Spanish government joint the US 
administration in the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ and therefore in the war in Iraq. On 11 March 
2004 Spain was shocked by the Madrid train bombings in which 191 people died. Directly 
after the attacks the political dilemma of the governing PP was twofold: 28
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Firstly, announcing that an Islamist organisation had perpetrated a terrorist attack in Spain was 
going to make the PP’s unpopular decision to support the American military intervention in Iraq a 
damaging issue in an election (held three days later) it was fully expecting to win. Secondly, by hin-
ting at the involvement of ETA, the PP government was attempting to endorse its hard line towards 
Basque nationalism (Moreno, 2005).
Thus, the PP accused ETA, even after the Spanish police was almost convinced that the 
attacks were committed by Islamic fundamentalists. It is hard to prove that there is a direct 
connection between the loss of the PP in the folowing elections. A fact is that “in total, 2.6 
million voters, more than 10 percent changed their behaviour as a consequence of the attacks” 
(Colomer, 2005). The Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) became the governing 
party, with Zapatero as its president, a function he holds until today. The first day after his 
victory he ordered all Spanish troops to be withdrawn from Iraq. In May 2005 Zapatero, with 
support of the Spanish Parliament, offered to start talks with ETA if the group ended violence. 
In March 2006 ETA announced a permanent cease-fire, a promise it broke in December of the 
same year with an bomb attack in the airport of Madrid. The last terrorist attack committed by 
ETA took place on 30 October 2008 with a bomb attack nearby the University of Navarre. In 
the beginning of the ETA years, the organization its aim, and at the same time its legitimacy, 
was liberate the Basque state from an authoritarian government. In contemporary time, it is 
Europe’s last terrorist organisation, and its position can be defined as at the extreme left of the 
political spectrum. ETA its recruitement mainly takes place under young people living on the 
Basque countryside or certain small areas of the main Basques cities, who have a preference 
for anarchism.  
In July 1998, the main nationalist parties in Galicia, the Basque Country and Catalonia 
signed a joined declaration demanding that Spain should be defined as a multi-lingual, multi-
cultural and multi-national state, known as the Declaration of Barcelona. “After twenty years of 
democracy, Spain continues, as they see it, to retain its essentially unitary character and has not 
yet resolved the national question” (Guiberanu, 2000b). Eight years later the national question 
is still not solved if we take a closer look at the Reform on the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 
of 19 July 2006. This reform was approved by a referendum held under the Catalan population. 
A first sign that the national question is not solved yet is that the law does not have a legal value 
according to the Spanish government since the Spanish Constitution recognizes the ‘Unity 
of the Spanish nation’. In the Preamble of the Reform the Parliament of Catalonia states that: 
‘The Catalan people have maintained a constant will to self-government over the course of the 29
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centuries’. (…) ‘Catalonia’s self-government is founded on the Constitution, and also on the 
historical rights of the Catalan people, which, in the framework of the Constitution, give rise 
to recognition in this Estatut of the unique position of the Generalitat. Catalonia whishes to 
develop its political personality within the framework of a State which recognises and respects 
the diversity of identities of the peoples of Spain’.(…) And, ‘in reflection of the feelings and 
the wishes of the citizens of Catalonia, the Parliament of Catalonia has defined Catalonia as a 
nation by an ample majority. The Spanish Constitution, in its second Article, recognises the 
national reality of Catalonia as a nationality’.
The Spanish state transformed from a dictatorship in a well-functioning democracy in the 
thirthy-four years after Franco’s death. Membership of the, then European Community (EC), 
nowadays, European Union (EU), in 1986 contributed to a economic growth improving the 
living conditions of most Spaniards. 2008 was a good year for nationalism with a lot of Spanish 
successes in sports. Nevertheless, the ‘national question’ is still not solved. The three historical 
nationalities ask more autonomy than the central government ever wants to give. Is there 
hope in this situation, or is it an dead-ended track? In “From Competitive Regionalism to 
Cooperative Federalism: The Europeanization of the Spanish State of the Autonomies”, Tanja 
Börzel argues that membership of the European Union can contribute to the political well-
being of the Spanish state. Börzel argues that Spain is moving from competitive regionalism to 
cooperative federalism. To explain the term ‘cooperative regionalism’ we have to take another 
look at the assymetrical model of the Spanish state formulated in the 1978 Constitution. 
From the beginning of the democratic state the Constitution distinguished the different 
autonomies. There were the three historical nationalities which had more competencies than 
the other communities. This situation knew a few unwanted consuequences, considering 
that the founders of the Constitution strived for unity and solidarity within the Spanish state. 
Firstly, the three historical communities looked at each other and were not always happy with 
their own position in the Spanish state. A good example is Catalonia its struggle for better tax 
conditions, claiming that the Basques had their ‘conciertos económicos’. Secondly, some of 
the other communities than historical autonomies started to imitate those communities and 
therefore inventing their history, traditions and culture, hoping that this would give them the 
same status as the historical nationalities. We can conclude that both consequences did not 
contribute to the unity of the Spanish state, rather it made the autonomies more differentiated 
subjects than they were before. Ultimately, the Spanish state does not see itself as a federal state. 
However, in practice, the state has a lot of characteristics of a federal state. Not recognizing 30
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its federal status makes things much more complicated than admitting that Spain is moving 
towards federalism. 
In her article, Börzel explains that the role of the seventeen autonomies in European 
policymaking creates a situation in which federalization is becoming factual and is, in a way, 
recognised by the Spanish state. 
In 1994, the Spanish government and the seventeen autonomies (ACs) agreed on a formal proce-
dure for the autonomous communities to participate in European policymaking through joint coo-
peration with the Spanish government. The Spanish government informs the ACs of all European 
issues relevant to their competencies or interests. The autonomous communities can formulate 
joint positions on specific issues, which the Spanish government must consider in formulating its 
bargaining position. (…) For the first time, the seventeen ACs are formally and jointly participa-
ting in central-state decision-making (Börzel, 2000).
Important in this process of Europeanization is that the mutual dependence between central 
government and the autonomies increases. It took almost a decade for the central government 
and the autonomies to reach sort of a level of ‘cooperation’ and ‘mutual dependence’. 
When Spain joined the European Community in 1986 it had to adopt the whole acquis com-
munautaire (a term to qualify the whole amount of European legislation) at once, which led to a 
considerable policy overload. In order to ensure that the acquis communautaire was incorporated 
quickly, the Spanish government succesfully ‘captured’ the legal implementation of virtually every 
European policy, even where the implemenation of such policies came under the competencies of 
the autonomous communities. Thus, the implementation of European policies allowed the cen-
tral state to access regional competencies, which were outside its remit for domestic policymaking 
under the Spanish constitution. Instead of cooperating with the Spanish government in European 
policymaking, the autonomous communities pursued a two-fold strategy of ‘circumventing and 
confronting the state’. On one hand, they tried to bypass the Spanish government by establishing 
direct contacts with European institutions. On the other hand, individual autonomous communi-
nities litigated against the central state before the Constitutional Court wherever they perceived an 
intrusion by the central state into the sphere of their competencies in European policymaking. The 
attempt of the Spanish regions to bring any intrusion by the central state into their autonomous 
sphere of competencies before the Constitutional Court proved equally ineffective. Catalonia and 
the Basque Country in particular initiated a series of Constitutional conflicts over competencies 31
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with respects to the implementation of European policies. In most cases, though, the Court deci-
ded in favour of the central state (Börzel, 2000).
This situation lasted until the central state and the autonomies agreed to cooperate in the 
1994 agreement. Although, there still is not a situation of total agreement between the state 
and the regions, the move to, what Börzel calls, cooperative federalism could have positive 
consequences. If the ‘European project’ keeps developing with this speed, more and more 
European policies become more important than domestic policies. In the Spanish case, this 
would mean, more and more cooperation and mutual dependence between regions and 
state. Moreover, if cooperation on European level is satisfying for both sides, more agreement 
and better cooperation on domestic level is easier to accomplish. Ultimately, as I stressed out 
before, as a Catalan argument for more autonomy, regional politics brings politics closer to the 
people and therefore strengthens the democratic state. A further move to federalism would 
have a higher degree of democracy as a consequence.   
Bolivia 2. 
Politically, Bolivia is a very complicated country. Within the political spectrum exist 
different conflicting currents. To understand contemporary Bolivia, with on the one side 
Morales´ ´Movement to Socialism´ and on the other the capitalist entrepreneurs in the Eastern 
Lowlands, it is useful to take a look at the country’s history. The main question in this, second, 
part of this working paper will be: Why do parts of Bolivia wish for autonomy? Starting with 
a very important political change in the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century, 
I will explain how these conflicting currents were created and why this conflict is the main 
reason some departments are demanding autonomy. The second historical period which I 
will highlight will be the current polarization of political thoughts starting with the ´Gas War´ 
of October 2003. I believe that these historical events, the National Revolution of 1952 and 
the rise of Evo Morales can be a good survey to understand contemporary Bolivia better. 
Bolivian history before the 1952 National Revolution was marked by a few factors. Firstly 
there was the development of divided regions, each with an own highly developed culture and 
identity. Geographical obstacles such as mountains, desserts and forests, had as a consequence 
that, for example, there wasn’t even a highway between Cochabamba and Santa Cruz until 
1954. Thus, Bolivian society was one of different identities. Nevertheless, there was one 
common characteristic for all the regions. 32
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Since independence in 1825, society had been dominated by a white, Spanish-speaking, Euro-
peanized elite, which controlled economic and political power and exploited the Quechua and 
Aymara speaking peasantry. The mestizo and usually bilingual urban lower classes, lower middle 
class, and rural freehold farmers occupied an uneasy intermediate position between the elite and 
the indigenous masses (Springer, 2005).
As I will explain in the next section, ultimately, the middle-class contributed heavily to 
the National Revolution. Since 1825, political power was based on force. With a middle-class 
more and more opposing, instead of accepting or not acting against, this kind of political 
power, the Bolivian political spectrum started to change. The starting point of this big change 
was the Chaco War.   
Towards the 1952 National Revolution 2.1. 
The Chaco War has been an important event in the history of Bolivia. Events, that, happened 
during the war and the ultimate defeat provoked the reformation of Bolivian society, in a social 
revolution nineteen years after the beginning of the war. After its independence, both Bolivia 
and Paraguay claimed territory over a part of the ´Grand Chaco´, the Chaco Boreal. Like it 
did with the Atacama province in the Ten Centavos or Pacific War with Chile, fought between 
1879 and 1884, “Bolivia based its claim on the principle that Spanish colonial territory should 
directly transfer to the new independent nations of Latin America” (Morales, 2004). In the 
thirty years of diplomatic conflict over the Chaco Boreal region, Paraguay received unexpected 
support from the United States, which totally ignored Bolivian rights. This support would after 
the war feed rumors over other countries or foreign companies having interest in the territory, 
beside Paraguay. The diplomatic conflict was strengthened by some border conflicts in the late 
1920s, in which Bolivian soldiers died. Because of this Bolivian public was pressuring for a war. 
“Although the Chaco territory was not essential to land-rich Bolivia the chauvinistic climate 
of both governing and opposition drove Bolivia into the war” (Morales, 2004). Thus Bolivia 
tried to conquer an area it didn’t need, moreover in the late 1920s the price of tin drop heavily, 
therefore, the country was facing an economic crisis. 
The size and nature of the territory was more or less useless to Bolivia. This changed 
when rumors about oil deposits fed Bolivian aggression. This, together with the United States 
choosing Paraguay´s side in the diplomatic conflict, 33
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Bolivians, especially after the war, generally held that United States and British corporate interests 
had supported Paraguay indirectly through Argentina. They believed (and most still do) that the 
American and British Oil companies, Standard Oil and Royal Dutch Shell, respectively were be-
hind the Chaco War. Historians have still to uncover definitive proof to support this popular Boli-
vian conspiracy theory found in national history texts (Morales, 2004).
What W. Morales calls ´a conspiracy theory´ is, in this working paper, the first example of a 
Bolivian paranoid nationalistic mentality which is called ´the Potosí syndrome´ by Dunkerley 
(2007). Potosí, once one of the most flourishing cities of the continent because of its rich 
deposits of natural resources, was exploited by the Spaniards. 
Like with many other wars in history, war broke out because of a little conflict at the 
Bolivian-Paraguayan border. Beside the economic crisis, Bolivia wasn’t ready for a war, “Bolivian 
generals were fully aware that Bolivia was unprepared for total war. Unable to deter him, they 
forced president Salamanca to take complete personal responsibility in writing” (Morales, 
2004). Salamanca’s inpatient and aggressive attitude not only meant his own downfall, he 
was replaced by the military during the war, but also for the political group he represented, as 
would turn out in the years following the war. Ultimately, the war became a humiliating defeat 
for the Bolivian army. The Paraguayan army even reached far into Bolivian territory, close to 
the regions of Santa Cruz and Tarija, or in other words, Bolivia’s oil supplies. In the end, the 
Bolivian army was able to defend its own country´s territory, but nothing more than that. It 
pushed the Paraguayans back until the Central Chaco, after that a cease-fire was agreed which 
not turned out into a final peace treaty until July 1938. During the war about 60,000 Bolivians 
and 40,000 Paraguayans died.
Why is the Chaco War seen as the starting point for a change in Bolivian society which 
ultimately turned into the national revolution of 1952? First of all, almost 200,000 soldiers 
were mobilized for the war, at least half were of indigenous origin. 
Prior to 1952, there had been very little communication between the indigenous majority (of the 
population) and the Westernized minority. This was a major barrier to the political socialization 
of Bolivia. Before the Chaco War, social mobility was possible only through the military, through 
acquisition of wealth or formal education, or through politics, all of which were open only to a very 
few individuals outside the urban minority (Bergsten, 1964).34
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The appeal of the government and the military to the indigenous population for the 
recruitment of Chaco War soldiers had three consequences: firstly, there was an increase of 
communication between indigenous and Westernized Bolivians within the army. Secondly, 
“white officers used propaganda to stir the Indians to maximum effort, preaching the equality 
of their status and attempting to convey the idea that they, too, had a vital take in the outcome 
of the conflict” (Bergsten, 1964), thus providing new, more liberal, ideas about the indigenous 
position in Bolivian society. Finally, for the first time, a relatively high percentage of the 
indigenous people traveled to parts of the county outside their community and way of life, 
creating a new national awareness. To put it in W. Morales her words: 
The indigenous veterans who survived and returned from war were forever changed men. Many 
abandoned their old lives and were caught up in the postwar radicalism. The war had exposed the 
injustice of the old system and the corruption of the ruling class (Morales, 2004).
The Chaco War ended in 1935, the Bolivian society had changed. Nevertheless, it took 
until 1952 before real, politic change entered Bolivia. A new characteristic which entered the 
Bolivian political spectrum was something that probably could be best described through 
the term ´social´. More power to a broader part of Bolivian society providing more equality 
and justice. The personification of this change became Colonel Germán Busch. He was a 
young military reformer and represented a group of young veterans in the army, introducing 
military socialism. “At the heart of this new post-war nationalism and military socialism was 
anti-imperialism. (…) The goals were to liberate the country from the control of the private 
economic interest and to create a strong and independent Bolivian state”. To achieve this goal, 
Busch nationalized oil companies, created a constitutional reform and established improved 
working conditions. Busch committed suicide, some historians say because he was not satisfied 
with the speed the country was developing. After Busch’s death the oligarchy and conservative 
parties seized control again, although within a changed political system. A system in which a 
party like the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) could arise. Future leaders of 
the party supported socialist parties in these days. 
The MNR was founded on May 10, 1941, with Paz Estenssoro as its first leader. According to the 
official program, the party supported revolutionary nationalism, a strong and secure state, and the 
economic independence and sovereignty of the Bolivian people. The MNR´s orientation, therefo-
re, was a uniquely Bolivian blend of nationalism and socialism (Morales, 2004).35
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Moreover, in the second half of the 1940s a powerful tool was created for Bolivia’s future 
history: the political party- labor cooperation. A military political leader who contributed to this 
development was Villarroel. Favoring Busch’s military socialism and admiring European fascism, 
the Villarroel government received a lot of resistance from other parts of the world, especially 
the United States. Villarroel contributed in two ways to the development of the Bolivian state. 
He expanded labor unions and established the Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros 
de Bolivia (FSTMB), the miners union. Moreover, he expanded indigenous rights, sponsoring 
Bolivia’s first National Indigenous Congress. Part of the international pressure existed of the 
participation of the MNR within the Villarroel government. After internal pressure also 
increased, Villarroel decided to establish an exclusively military government. A few weeks after 
this decision, a mass of hundreds of strikers attacked the presidential palace, killed Villarroel 
and hung him from a lamppost, in front of the palace at Plaza Murillo. 
Villarroel was succeeded by the oligarchy in a period known as the ´Six Years´. In short, 
years of oligarchic rule, social struggle and repression. In particular, the indigenous people and 
the miners felt the revenge of the oligarchy. “The reactionary régimes of Herzog and Urriólgoitia, 
during the so-called ´Six Years´ from 1946 to 1952, were dominated by traditional interests” 
(Bergsten, 1964). In the ´Six Years´, most of the MNR leaders were in exile. Nevertheless, 
the party regained political because of intimate cooperation with labor, especially the miners. 
Moreover, the government’s repression undermined its legitimacy and, therefore, contributed 
to the popularity of the MNR. 
The National Revolution 2.2. 
What kind of revolution was the 1952 revolution? In my opinion there could be two 
different views or a combination of both. One view would be a socialist revolution started 
by parts of the working class. The best way to explain this view is by a conference of tin miner 
unions, adopted as the Thesis of Pulacayo (Morales, 2004). It declared that the Bolivian 
workers were the true and sole fighting vanguard of the revolution which had to come. As such, 
workers were to initiate an armed class struggle and directly move to establish a workers´ state. 
This agenda of militant struggle constituted a virtual declaration of war against the oligarchy. 
In April 1952, it where those mineworkers who made the breakthrough for the MNR in the 
Battle of La Paz. They attacked the government army in El Alto and cleared the way for MNR 
victory. 36
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Another view would be the ability of the MNR to combine various societal forces into 
one power. Beside that, the party was able to reach the middle class. Concluding one could say 
that it was a revolution of the Bolivian people. The MNR needed currents like the tin miners 
to create a revolutionary atmosphere. In 1949 it plotted its most serious coup before the final 
coup in 1952. Just like in 1952 would be the case, the military backed the government. The big 
difference between the two coups was that the MNR didn’t arm the people out of fear of the 
choas violence can create in 1949. Moreover, in the period between the failed and successful 
coup, middle-class support for the conservative and oligarchic government declined. The 
MNR emerged as a multi-class political party and this fitted in the revolutionary atmosphere 
of the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s. These developments led to a polarized 
society, one was, or in favor of change, or in favor of keeping things as they were, there was no 
middle way anymore. 
Looking back at the National Revolution, scholars have different opinions about the 
goals achieved and changes made by the MNR. The first reform made by the party was a new 
electoral law that guaranteed universal suffrage (Springer, 2005) to all, adult, Bolivian citizens. 
This meant the acceptation of a part of Bolivian society that never voted before. After a history 
of exclusion and oppression, corruption by the established order and racism of the indigenous 
majority, this was a significant and truly revolutionary change. Moreover, two policies had a 
significant effect on Bolivian society as well. Firstly, MNR´s program of Agrarian Reform. 
Until 1953, the year the Land Reform was initiated, Bolivia had undertaken two land reform 
programs.
The first was in 1825, the second in 1874 (…). Both were basically attempts to ´liberalize´ and 
modernize agriculture. Central to all three plans was the replacement of the Ayllus, the traditio-
nal indigenous agricultural communities based on lineage, with private individual land ownership 
(Morales, 2004). 
The MNR´s main concern was to destroy the old slavery system. This system is known 
as the ´hacienda system´, hacienda means estate, and the haciendas usually existed of large 
land-holdings. Some were plantations, mines, or even factories. A hacienda was owned by only 
one family, or sometimes a small group of people. This family or group was the only one who 
took the profits. ´Employers´ of the hacienda had to work under slavery circumstances. The 
Castilian, negatively loaded, term for the owners of a hacienda were called ´latifundistas´. A 
free translation would be ´agrarian exploiters´. 37
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Indeed, the MNR destroyed the old hacienda system. According to Bergsten, in his 
article, “Social Mobility and Economic Development: The Vital Parameters of the Bolivian 
Revolution”, especially, this reform, contributed to an increase of the possibility for social 
mobility in Bolivia. His article is written just before the military overthrew of the MNR 
government in 1964. Therefore his words are a bit too enthusiastic in my opinion, but they 
show an important contribution of the MNR to the improved position of the indigenous 
people:
(…) ´The Andean republic has made remarkable progress in breaking down centuries-old societal 
gaps. The MNR (…) has played a vital role in politically activating the traditional Indian segment 
of the population. The revolution of 1952 (…) virtually wiped out the upper class of Bolivian so-
ciety´ (Bergsten, 1964).
MNR´s program of land reform, in his view, took away Bolivia’s obstacle number one in 
promoting social mobility. “The ´Latifundistas´ were the most significant element blocking 
racial identity”. Bergsten dared to look into the future and has an interesting view towards the 
mixture of the different identities in the years after the article was published, namely in 1964. 
In Bolivia, however, a true amalgamation of cultures is taking place. Perhaps even more significantly, 
this amalgamation is occurring gradually: there is no sharp, painful, transition. The group, rather 
than the individual, is the locus of change. (…) A true mixture of Spanish and Indian traits is deve-
loping, to the extent that mestizos may even be found speaking Quechua. (…) The results of this 
process are highly favorable to the development of a politically-socialized society in Bolivia. (…) 
A new class, mixing traditional Indian and modern mestizo, will probably develop and become in-
creasingly important in Bolivian society. Intra-class boundaries may then form along occupational 
lines, with mobility to higher levels possible in succeeding generations (Bergsten, 1964).
Secondly, the MNR nationalized the mining industry in the same year as the National 
Revolution took place. With the nationalization Corporación Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL) 
was created. The nationalization had no effect on the middle and small mining companies, 
but was a direct measure against the ´latifundistas´, or oligarchy, of the mining industry. 
The nationalization proved to be a first test for the MNR where its position in the political 
spectrum exactly was.38
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Several of the medium-sized mines were US owned, and the MNR had no desire to directly con-
front the Unites States. Respecting the private property of these enterprises was intended to allay 
US suspicions concerning the MNR´s intentions and ideological orientation (Morales, 2004).
The decision the MNR had to make between its ´truly revolutionary character´ and 
politically the wisest decision showed the weakness of the MNR. The MNR was a multi-class, 
but also a multi-ideological party. When the Revolution took place, it was not a hard task to 
combine various angered groups. However, when policy had to be made the different visions 
appeared on the surface. 
Besides internal divisions within the MNR, other reasons made the impact of the MNR 
limited, according to some scholars. According to Dunkerley (2007) “the MNR leadership 
was a tie-wearing fraternity, for a while invigilated to the left by the FSTMB miners´ union, 
itself influenced by anarcho-syndicalist and Troskyist currents”. Moreover, firstly, “the very 
government decrees enacting radical reforms were addressed at a majority population that 
was hardly ever reached by any law, had no culture of literacy and was often not fluent in the 
language of administration” (Springer, 2005).
Secondly, Bolivia had been a country with certain social structures, hierarchy and racist 
characteristics for more than a century, which couldn’t be wiped out overnight. Finally, internal 
division within the MNR itself had a consequence regarding the military. The military became 
more independent from the MNR civilian government, forced the MNR to appoint General 
Barrientos as vice president, and when it was weakened enough it overthrew Paz Estenssoro´s, 
third term, government in 1964.  
Concluding, and regarding the political situation in contemporary Bolivia, I think that the 
MNR contributed to the country in two important ways, which go hand in hand with each 
other. It broke with old system of the ´master and slave´. The absolute minority elite which 
had ruled the country since independence had to take a step back. It became clear that, by 
far, the most part of the population didn’t want to continue living under this system. A merit 
of the MNR, therefore, was the mobilization of a Bolivian middle-class. Consequence, and 
the second contribution of the MNR, was the introduction of the indigenous majority in the 
political spectrum. By giving it the right to vote, it gave this social group political influence 
and dignity. Nevertheless, as the following years would learn us, Bolivia was very far from an 
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Re-democratization after military power 2.3. 
The most important reason why the National Revolution and the MNR policies had 
relatively such limited impact was the return of military rule in 1964, which reversed basically 
all changed policies. Keeping in mind that I´m investigating the topic of autonomy and not 
providing an overview of Bolivian national history; I will pay little attention to the military 
years between 1964 and 1982. The re-democratization was a fact in October 1982 when the 
Bolivian Congress revalidated the results of the 1980 election, which, because of military rule 
were never observed. Hernán Siles Zuazo (1982-1985) became the country´s first civilian 
president to be legally elected. In the years following the re-democratization, part of the political 
problems Bolivia faces today were created. The 1980s and 1990s could be characterized as a 
neo-liberal democracy. 
Three critical problems complicated the difficult transition to democracy. First Bolivia´s military 
governments had contracted massive national debts during the 1970s, a legacy of fiscal and eco-
nomic irresponsibility that plagued the new civilian presidents. Second, the political and economic 
order of the hemisphere and the world had been alterted significantly by the early 1980s´, such 
as globalization and liberalizing market forces. Finally, Bolivia became mired in a full-blown drug 
problem (Morales, 2004).
Two of these legacies are still part of Bolivia’s political spectrum. The economic problems 
were, in one’s eyes, solved by neo-liberal reforms. Others are very critical about these policies. 
One thing is sure and is that these capitalist reforms created part of the ideological struggle 
Bolivia faces today.
By 1985 a true democracy was established in Bolivia. Paz Estenssoro (1985-1989) was 
elected for his fourth term. Special about his election was that it marked, for the first time since 
Bolivian independence, a peaceful transfer of power between opposition political parties. It 
also meant a dramatically shift in political economy. 
If the (national) revolution stood for nationalizing the means of production, establishing universal 
franchise rights, and enacting radical agrarian reform, Paz´s final term in office initiated a series of 
changes that would make Bolivia a model country for neo-liberal reform (Lehoucq, 2008).
Paz´s  successors  Paz  Zamora  (1989-1993)  and  Sánchez  de  Lozada  (1993-1997) 
implemented far-reaching privatization policies in petroleum, gas and air transport companies. 40
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Especially under Sánchez de Lozada, this policy came to its neo-liberal climax. The privatization 
was a consequence of a tendency introduced by Paz Estnessoro called the New Economic 
Policy (NEP). This economic policy was introduced to bring the hyperinflation under control 
which the country suffered as a consequence of the military years. 
Although inflation was brought under control, severe recession followed and the resulting public 
discontent was stopped only by declaring a state of emergency. These policies represented a stri-
king departure from the MNR´s past. The collapse of world tin prices also accelerated the end of 
Bolivia´s powerful public mining monopoly. Within only two years the state mining giant COMI-
BOL was forced to lay off 75 percent of its workforce (Springer, 2005).
In this period, the two popular political parties on the right created a ´pact for democracy´, 
which  guaranteed  the  government  the  necessary  legislative  majority  to  implement  its 
programs. Moreover, “both left and right in the country’s multiparty system agreed to abide by 
election results, no matter how unpalatable these would be” (Lehoucq, 2008). Because of this 
politics were stabilized and it was possible for governments to implement structural reforms. 
With a stable political landscape and an economy slowly increasing after a huge downfall just 
after the re-democratization, Bolivia seemed to become a truly neo-liberal democracy.
A neo-liberal state is a state created after Western example. Moreover, Western states 
support countries like Bolivia to preserve this state model. If such a country does so it can 
expect financial support from those Western countries. A frequent consequence of this kind 
of cooperation is the involvement of the supporting country in home affairs of the receiving 
country. This exactly happened with Bolivia and the United States. The United States, in favor 
of the Bolivian government, were providing financial aid to Bolivia. Meanwhile, using or 
abusing the cooperative situation to achieve policy goals set at home. The United States, and 
its long-lasting ´War on Drugs´ found in president Banzer Suárez (1997-2001) the perfect 
ally in the eradication of the coca leaf in world´s, at that time, second largest cocaine producer. 
The ´democracy pact´ I mentioned earlier was an agreement between Paz Estenssoro, Paz 
Zamora and Sánchez Lozada MNR and Banzer Suárez´s Acción Democrática Nacionalista 
(AND). Banzer Suárez was one of the military dictators in the years between the National 
Revolution and re-democratization, from 1971 until 1978. Interestingly enough, he became 
president again in 1997, this time in a democratic way. Banzer Suárez´ shall be remembered for 
his ´zero coca´ policy. Thereby supporting the United States and co-creating an atmosphere in 
which Evo Morales could rise. “Cultivated in Bolivia for centuries and a highly valued trading 
commodity in the pre-Columbine era, it (the coca leaf) became an important crop from the 41
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seventies onwards as it provided the base for cocaine production” (Aguirre & Moreno, 2007). 
Because of the economic crisis after the years of military rule and the world wide collapse of 
tin prices, many former mine workers in the regions of Potosí and Oruro decided to move to 
the Chapare region to cultivate the coca leaf. The closing of many mines in combination with 
an increased demand for cocaine in the Western countries made the cultivation of the coca 
leaf an attractive business to work in. Another term for Banzer Suárez´ ´zero coca´policy is 
the, so-called, ´Dignity Plan´. Trained by US military, Bolivian anti-narcotic troops violated 
the rights of the coca-farmers and even causing deaths in coca producing communities. 
According to Springer:
Developments since the inauguration of Banzer in 1997 have shown that the assumed stability of 
Bolivia´s democracy was always more apparent than real. There has been popular frustration over 
the lack of social development and growing controversy associated with the illicit production and 
eradiction of coca, leading to a newly-found combativeness on the part of peasant organizations 
and unions (Springer, 2005).
In his inauguration speech for Congress, Morales declared: ´Long live coca and down 
with the Yanquis´. Coca is what gave Morales the chance to make a political career and why he 
has such an anti-American attitude. “Since 1988, as leader of the largest Chapare coca growers 
federation, Morales has passionately defended the farmers´ right to grow the sacred leaf, 
arguing that the cocaleros were not addicted to coca but to eating” (Morales, 2004). However, 
there was more than Banzer Suárez violent attempt to eradicate coca. Firstly, the NEP policy 
didn’t have the outcome the neo-liberal governments of the 1990s wished for. 
Economic analyses suggest that liberalization (NEP) has not produced the desired outcome. Rea-
llocation of resources from declining industries, which were forced to close or cut back produc-
tion under the impact of import competition, has not lead to new resources for export activities. 
Productivity in manufacturing has only grown minimally, and mainly because of reductions of the 
workforce. Such growth in exports as has occurred has been mainly in the area of primary and semi-
processed goods, reinforcing Bolivia´s status as a natural resource exporter, vulnerable to external 
shocks and the fluctuations of international commodity prices (Springer, 2005).
In the eyes of the majority of the Bolivian people the neo-liberal experiment failed. Simply 
because they didn’t notice an increase of their income in the period of re-democratization. 
Moreover, at the end of the 1990s the average citizen didn’t have faith in the leaders of their 
state because of corruption scandals, and the fact that a small part of the population profited 42
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from the neo-liberal economy. Especially large landowners and agro-entrepeneurs in the 
Eastern Lowlands took advantage of the liberal policies. In other words, the poor remained 
poor and the rich became richer.
The combination of violence against your own people, thereby trying to wipe out a sacred 
symbol of Bolivian society, the not improved living conditions and knowing that some of 
the leaders of your country are taking money which belongs to the collective created a bomb 
which had to explode. The first explosion took place during the so-called ´Water War´ in 
Cochabamba. After the privatisation of a lot of public services, the Banzer Suárez government, 
under pressure of the World Bank, decided to privatise the water and sanitation system in 
Cochabamba,  and  sell  it  to  “the  consortium  Aguas  del  Tunari  led  by  the  International 
Water Limited (IWL). IWL is jointly owned by the US construction company Bechtel and 
the Italian energy company Edison” (Lobina, 2000), in 1999. In the following year, prices 
threatened to hike two-hundered percent or more and the people of Cochabamba began an 
uprising, spread overall several months. This uprising can be considered as the starting point 
of mob rule which would dominate the first decade of twenty-first century for Bolivia. Just as 
in other uprisings, mass demonstrations and road blocks gave the people what they wanted: 
the government teared up the contract.
The rise of MAS and the division of Bolivia 2.4. 
In 2002, Sánchez de Lozada, his popular name is ´Goni´, became president for the second 
time, successing Quiroga who was vice-president under Banzer Suárez, but succeeded him after 
Banzer Suárez had to resign because of illness. In the 2002 elections, Morales became second 
in the race for president, however, his Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) lead the opposition 
in Congress after elections. The years after 2002 have shown Bolivia´s weakness, of being a 
state in which cooperation between opposing groups seems impossible. Ideologically the 
state of Bolivia seems a contradiction. The last six years made clear how far the different groups 
are, ideologically, divided. Geographically, it would be untrue to speak of ´Two Bolivia´s´, 
there is not a full East-West confrontation. But, in my opinion, in an ideological way one can 
speak of at least more than one Bolivia. In this section, first I will try to explain on the hand of 
articles out of the Economist the visions of the various ideological groups. In the second part 
I will argue why I believe what the autonomy problem looks like.43
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Since 2003 Bolivia has been ruled by the streets, not by democracy. The Cochabamba ´Water War´ 
was the first sign of this kind of governing. After a history of repression, the re-democratization of 
the 1980s brought true democracy to Bolivia. Nevertheless, the neo-liberal governments failed to 
convince the people of the advantages of democracy because of the war on coca, corruption and 
a, in some opinions, the failed economic system. It is hard to judge whether the neo-liberal system 
failed or not. On the one hand, the average Bolivian didn’t saw its income increase, on the other 
hand, without privatization of the oil and gas industry many deposits of oil and gas wouldn´t have 
discovered. What if the neo-liberal governments would have had the chance to exploit these oil 
and gas deposists, the second-largest of Latin America? In 2003 became clear that there would be 
no opportunity to do so. In January of that year, police and coca farmers clashed. Six protesters died 
while more than fifty people from both sides were wounded by rocks and bullets´2.
In the next month army and police turned their guns at each other in an protest against the 
government spending cuts and new income taxes. Under the protesters were many policemen. 
At a point, both sides, police and army turned to bullets and twenty-seven people died. In 
order to get the police back on duty the government agreed to withdraw certain proposals 
from Congress. This was the first sign that road blocks, protests and uprisings could work for 
the radical social movements supporting and initiating these actions. Besides taxes, there was 
another concern for the Sánchez de Lozada government, namely, its plans of shipping liquified 
natural gas to the United States and Mexico through Chile. 
“The armed forces, in particular, resented the use of Chile; and Goni now owed them his 
life”3 after the confrontation in which twenty-seven people died. Within the army, the War of 
the Pacific was still not forgotten, the war which made Bolivia a landlocked country. Dunkerley 
argues that in contemporary Bolivia two different armies exist, 
René Zavaleta Mercado postulates, in his study of the political crisis of 1997-80, the existence of 
two distinct Bolivian armies, the first of which reflects the nationalist tradition: ´This is the army 
that must feel those aspects of the nation that existed before the nation or lie behind its particularism, such as 
the properties of the earth and the corprorist vision of the world´. This is the army that occupied the San 
Alberto gas field on 1 May 2006 (to which I will return later). The second of Zavaleta´s armies is 
more widely recognisable: ´The classical army, the essential reason for which is the fear of the noche triste. 
The function of this army is to resist the siege of the Indians…, that atavism known as Tupaj Katari´.
2  ´Coca and Socialism´, Economist, 1/25/2003, Vol. 366, Issue 8308, pp. 39-39, 1/3 p.
3  ´What will the IMF say now?´, Economist, 2/22/2003, Vol. 366, Issue 8312, pp 33-33, 1p.44
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Here we encounter the armed forces of October 2003, when some seventy civilians were shot 
down precisely in order to break the ´siege´ of La Paz from (and by) El Alto through the withhol-
ding of oil supplies. (Dunkerley, 2007).
One of the most profound disputes in Bolivian politics of the last decade has been over the 
privatization of oil and gas fields. The dispute came to a peak in October 2003. In September 
“thousands of marchers tramped for seven days to La Paz to ´declare war´ on a range of 
government policies”4. Most important issue was the pipeline through Chile. According to 
the government, this project could almost double Bolivia´s legal exports. Moreover, “the IMF 
estimates that Bolivia´s oil and gas sector could add an average of 1% to GDP growth over the 
next five years, if projects to market the gas materialise”5, these figures were calculated in 2003. 
The march was followed by a general strike and demonstrations. “Goni turned to the army to 
restore order. It failed to do so, at a cost of at least 53 lives”6. On October 17th, Sánchez de Lozada 
resigned from office, thereby ending the period of neo-liberal governments which ruled since 
re-democratization in 1982. The protesters, and from this point on, called the social movement 
in this working paper, is a mix of Andean indian farmers, student and neighbourhood groups 
as well as the unions, supported by leftist political parties such as MAS. In my opinion, this 
event is a crucial point in, on the one hand the polarization of the country, and on the other 
hand the starting point for the wish of autonomy for certain regions. It made clear that there 
was no room for talks, debate or negotiations. The social movements wouldn’t stop paralyzing 
the country until their demands were met and the government couldn’t handle the situation 
and therefore used the power of force.
Vice-president Mesa succeeded Sánchez de Lozada. “He gained respect by withdrawing 
his support from Goni, saying that he could no longer remain part of a government that 
had caused so many bloodshed”7. Mesa appointed a non-party cabinet existing of primarily 
specialists and scientists. Moreover, Mesa was, and maintained until his resignation very 
popular under the Bolivian population. One could conclude that Mesa, during his presidency, 
always tried to choose the middle way between what would be the best for the country and 
what the social movements demanded. Mesa gave in to a demand for a Constituent Assembly, 
therefore, for a while Morales supported the president in defending the democracy. With a 
Constituent Assembly we arrive at another point the social movements demanded in a non-
4  ´Highly flammable´, Economist, 9/13/2003, Vol. 368, Issue 8341, p. 34-34, ½ p. 
5  ´Highly flammable´, Economist, 9/13/2003, Vol. 368, Issue 8341, p. 34-34, ½ p.
6  ´On the Brink´, Economist, 10/18/2003, Vol. 369, Issue 8346, p. 36-38, 2p.
7  ´After the Uprising´, Economist, 10/25/2003, Vol. 369, Issue 8347, p. 34-35, 2p.45
Valentino Vondenhoff
negotiable way. One of the main priorities for the indigenous population, which the social 
movements claim to represent, “is laws to implement the constitutional proclamation of 
collective rights and local self-government”8. In the end Mesa came under siege by the same 
social movements that had toppled his predecessor. In December 2004 Mesa´s government 
announced an increase in the price of diesel and petrol. The social movements reacted with 
civic strikes and blockades. Just as Sánches de Lozada did after the ´bloodbad´ of October 
2003, ending government´s ideas about the exportation of gas to the United States and 
Mexico through Chile, Mesa admitted to the social movement´s demands and therefore 
“scrapped an unpopular contract under which a French group supplies water to La Paz”9. In 
March 2004, Mesa threatened to resign for the first time, after “radical movements hostile 
to private investment in Bolivia´s oil-and-gas sector had been blocking roads for weeks”10. 
Ultimately, after his third threath to resign, his resignation became a fact in June of the same 
year. Another period of road blockades, strikes and protest had paralyzed Bolivia again and 
Mesa saw no other option than to quit. 
What is it that we can learn from the period 2003-2005? First of all, the rise of indigenous 
movements was politically finalized. These groups showed that they can paralyze Bolivia for 
weeks if they want to. The motive of the indigenous movements is one of anger. They still are, 
by far, the group in Bolivian society which lives under the worst living circumstances. They 
live in poverty, they, compared to the rest of the population, don´t get the same basic services 
like education and health service. After almost two centuries of oppression and discrimination 
they still feel discriminized and marginalized in Bolivia. Enough reasons to fight for their 
rights, therefore another interesting question would be, why now? Why the first decade of the 
twenty-first century? The answer is twofold. First of all, a worldwide development which most 
of the indigenous groups oppose, globalisation. The movements are linked to a worldwide 
network  and  are  able  to  collaborate  more  intensive  than  before.  Secondly,  democracy. 
Democracy brought the indigenous people, finally, the right to vote, to participate politically. 
In the longest democratic ruled period in Bolivian history, after re-democratization, it became 
clear that these people don´t want to live in a neo-liberal, and more important, Westernized 
state. Moreover, the same liberal government helped the indigenous movements a little with a 
constitutional change in 1994. To explain the consequences brought because of this change I 
8  ´A Political Awakening´, Economist, 2/21/2004, Vol. 370, Issue 8363, p. 35-37, 3p.
9  ´Water, Oil and the Mob´, Economist, 1/22/2005, Vol. 374, Issue 8410, p. 35-36, 2p.
10  ´A President under siege´, Economist, 3/19/2005, Vol. 374, Issue 8418, p. 44-44, 1p.46
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will cite out of, first “Re-founding the State in Bolivia” by Aguirre and Moreno, second out of 
Lehoucq´s article “Bolivia´s Constitutional Breakdown” 
The 1994 Popular Participation Law encouraged municipalisation of the territory. In Bolivia there 
are 327 municipalities with participative budgets. Thanks to the development of civil society in 
Bolivia, 42 percent of the citizens who had been classed before as rural and did not usually vote 
were able to vote, and to a large extent this support helped to bring Evo Morales to power (Aguirre 
and Moreno,2007)
Explained by Lehoucq: 
It was none other than a neo-liberal electoral reform that helped to undermine the political founda-
tion of the newfound liberal consensus. In the mid-1990s, Bolivia went from closed-list proportio-
nal representation (PR) to a German-style, mixed-member proportional (MMP) system that ex-
panded voters´ choices and fueled a market for anti-establishment parties. Under the new system, 
each voter could not only select the congressional representative from his or her single-member 
plurality district (SMPD)- there were sixty of these- but could also use fused ballots to select ano-
ther sixty deputies in multimember PR districts. Adopted in 1994 and first used in 1997, the MMP 
system allowed SMPD candidates to bypass the leaders of existing parties and appeal directly to 
voters. Morales´s first elective office was on of these seats, which he won with the largest majority 
of any such candidate in the 1997 elections (Lehoucq, 2008)
Contemporary Bolivia: the government 2.5. 
Morales won the December 2005 election by convincing, not only the poor and the 
indigenous to vote for him, but also a majority of the middle-class. Sick of the corruption by 
the established parties and thinking it would be better to have Morales in the government than 
on the streets made them decide to give him the opportunity to start his ´social revolution´. 
The middle-class, at the same time, is Morales biggest concern. He has to choose between 
his radical and extremist allies of the social movements and the moderate middle-class. Him 
becoming moderate would have cost him the support of the poor and, maybe, even the 
indigenous people whom he represent. In the beginning of his presidency it appeared that he 
chose for the moderate route. Today, we know that he didn’t and thereby dividing the country 
more and more.47
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Morales´s government first radical act was the nationalization of the country´s biggest 
natural-gas field, San Alberto, on May 1st 2006. “Wearing an oilworker´s hard hat, he read out 
a nine-point decree under which the Bolivian state proclaimed its control of the country´s oil 
and gas industry. (…) The state recovers title, possession and total and absolute control over 
these resources”11. For the foreign companies, exploiting the fields, most drastic measure was 
the raise of taxes from 50 percent to 82 percent. Under the neo-liberal governments taxes for 
those companies amounted only 18 percent. Morales played a risky game and at first sight 
it seemed like a victory, while most companies in October signed contracts conditioned to 
Morales´s terms, Although, 
the new terms are less draconian for the companies than the May 1st nationalisation decree, but 
much harsher than the original contracts. Petrobas, the biggest operator, with almost half of the gas 
reserves, will now pay royalties and taxes of 50 percent, down from 82 percent under the decree. 
Broadly speaking that is in line with a 2005 law approved under the government of Mesa12
A law, Morales, at that moment, considered too weak. On the other hand he lost with 
the nationalisation, while in August of the same year the government had to suspend the full 
takeover of the gas fields because it was short in economic resources. In other words, showing 
that “it is not knowing the business or being able to control it”13. 
The second radical act, thereby losing a lot of support of the middle-class, was the 
Constituent Assembly. On July 2nd 2006, MAS won 50 percent of the vote in the elections 
for the Constituent Assembly. This meant 135 of the 255 seats. To rewrite the Constitution a 
two-thirds majority is needed, according to the 1994 constitution. After months of disputes 
between representers in the Assembly it became clear that MAS wasn’t going to get what it 
wanted. Different point of views seemed to make the draft of the constitution impossible. 
Mainly over the wish of Morales to remove the ban on presidents standing for a second 
consecutive term, and, over local autonomy, “the president seemed reluctant to cede power 
to what he called an ´oligarchy´ in Santa Cruz. But he wanted to devolve power to radical 
social movements that make up much of his political base”14. Then there was the illegal draft 
of the Constitution in December 2007. According to Article 232 of the former Constitution 
a change of the Constitution requires two thirds of the votes of the members present in the 
11  ´Now it´s the people´s gas´, Economist, 5/6/2006, Vol. 379, Issue 8476, p. 37-38, 2p.
12   A hard bargain´, Economist, 11/4/2006, Vol. 381, Issue 8502, p. 46-48, 2p.
13  ´Out of gas´, Economist, 8/19/2006, Vol. 380, Issue 8491, p. 34-34, 1/2p. 
14   ´A Revolution faces the voters´, Economist, 7/1/2006, Vol. 380, Issue 8484, pp. 33-34, 2p.48
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National Congress and cannot be vetoed by the president of the Republic. “At a marathon 16-
hour session held at the University of Oruro, a rump of the Constituent Assembly (164 of its 
255) members, most supporters of Morales) rubber-stamped all of the 411 clauses of the new 
charter. But the opposition boycotted the session; it claims the document is illegal, since it 
was not approved by the required two-thirds majority of the Assembly”15. Thus, the governing 
part approved the Constitution without much of the opposition present. On January 25th 
2009, the new Constitution was approved by referendum. Rumours about not being a fair 
referendum are deepening the division in Bolivia. 
Land reform is his third big initiative. In 2007 “he promised to redistribute a total of 20m 
hectares including privately owned land indentified as ´unproductive´, obtained illegaly or 
used for speculation by the end of  2011”16. The majority of productive land in Bolivia is in the 
hands of only a few, some 50,000 families. With his ´agrarian revolution´ Morales hopes to 
redistribute part of the land to indigenous groups and workers communities.   
Contemporary Bolivia: the opposition 2.6. 
Morales is backed by the majority of the Bolivian population. In the second half of 2008 
another referendum was held. The population was asked to declare if they were in favor or 
against Morales and vice-president Gracía Linera. At the same time they were asked to judge 
their region´s prefecto. The outcome was a percentage of 68 in favor of Morales. “But the four 
eastern governors also secured strong new mandates, winning a higher share of the vote than 
when they were originally elected”17. The situation is, that, those who are against Morales are 
extremely against him. This has nothing to do with the place where someone was born, or 
where someone lives, but is strictly ideological. Thereby, are the ´pro-MAS´ and ´anti-MAS´ 
visions so extremely different that cooperation, in my eyes, is impossible. 
Talking about those who have regionalist visions, is talking about a part of the political right. 
Regionalist visions are the strongest in the ´media luna´, Bolivia´s eastern part of the country 
which has the shape of a half moon. The departments of the half moon are Pando, Beni, Santa 
Cruz and Tarija. As I mentioned before, it would be untrue to speak of ´la media luna´ versus 
the Western Highlands or Altiplano. A part of MAS voters live in the Eastern Lowlands, just as, 
15   ´Double or quits´, Economist, 12/15/2007, Vol. 385, Issue 8559, pp. 44-44, 2/3p 
16   ´Land Battles´, Economist, 9/23/2006, Vol. 380, Issue 8496, p.41-41, 2/3p.
17   ´Evo´s Big Win´, Economist, 8/16/2008, Vol. 388, Issue 8593, p. 36-37, 2p.49
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Morales has a lot of opponents in business-minded La Paz. The situation is, that those favoring 
MAS, or indigenous rights, in the East don´t have any power in the region. A good example of 
a powerful ´anti-MAS´ and capitalist political player in the Eastern region is the Comité Pro 
Santa Cruz (CPSC). The CPSC has played a pivotal role in making Santa Cruz´s demands 
for autonomy a reality. The Committee can be best described as a powerful business elite. It 
origins go back to the 1950s when Santa Cruz was a very small city, in the, then, economically 
unimportant Eastern region. At that time, the region was in desperate need of attention by 
the government. A group of students brought together various civic forces and created the 
CPSC. The first priority was to get Santa Cruz integrated into the Bolivian state, therefore it 
needed a road connection with Cochabamba. In January 1951, the first ´cabildo´ or town hall 
meeting was organized. This was the beginning of a long tradition of such meetings until today 
to express ´Cruceño´ demands (Assies, 2006)18. Its current chairman is Branko Marinkovic, 
a Bolivian from Croatian origin. “The paradox of wealth and a transnationalized identity make 
Marinkovic a perfect icon of the regionalist turn: Though regionalism revolves around claims 
of deeply rooted historical particularity, it also thrives on accomodations with transnational 
sources of wealth and power” (Gustafson, 2008). The CPSC struggle seem to have become 
violent over the last years. “The most notorious example is the Unión Juvenil Cruceñista 
(UJC). The young men´s counterpart to Marinkovic´s civic committee. The UJC merges 
violent cultural substrates linked to sports hooliganism, martial arts and yought fighting into a 
directed instrument to enforce civic strikes, attack peasant and pro-MAS marches, and assault 
disputed public institutions like tax agencies, school administrations, labor unions and water 
management entities” (Gustafson, 2008)
The regionalist demands started with the social uprisings at the end of the Sánchez de 
Lozada period. The most popular tool used by the social movements were road blockades. The 
´road block´ had a negative economic consequence for both social movements sympathizers 
and opponents. First of all, it worsened the economic instability Bolivia was suffering in the 
years before. Secondly, the poor indigenous people suffered most from the blockades, because 
basic services like medication, food and, for some important, gasoline couldn´t reach them. 
Finally, the blockades were preventing the Eastern region to export any gas or soya beans, in 
the case of the ´Cruceños´. Together with the election of Morales in December 2005 was, 
for the first time, the direct election of the departmental governors or prefectos. The prefectos 
18  Assies, W, ´La Media Luna Sobre Bolivia; Nación, Región, Etnia y ClaseSocial´, América Latina Hoy, Vol. 43, 2006, pp. 
87-105.50
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elected in the ´media luna´, all, were in favor of autonomy. Another reason why the regions are 
demanding autonomy is the difference between, that, what they are contributing to the state 
and what they receive. In the case of Bolivia´s richtest region, Santa Cruz, it “contributes 42 
percent of the country´s tax revenues but receives just 22 percent of public expenditure”19 in 
2007. “Although MAS has support in the East, many there feel that they produce the country´s 
wealth which a paraistic government wants to grab. But the view of La Paz is that much of the 
East´s wealth is ill-gotten, and its businessmen are unpatriotic”20. Moreover, what happens 
with public expenditure is, almost completely, decided by the central government. It appoints 
teachers, doctors, policemen and before 2005, also governors. But maybe the most important 
reason why those departments are striving for autonomy is Morales´s becoming more and 
more an authoritarian leader. We may even speak of heading to a dictatorship. The first signs of 
fear were expressed when Morales became closer with Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez, now 
there are also good connections with Cuba, both not world´s most democratic regimes. Fear 
became bigger after the draft of the national Assembly. Now the Constitution is accepted by 
referendum, Morales has more power than ever. 
All this lead to the four departments held a referendum on May 4th 2008, all approved a 
´yes´ in the unofficial referenda. Unofficial, because the government didn’t recognize them 
and called them illegal. “As if to confirm their judgement, the national government, felt obliged 
to take out full-page newspaper advertisements declaring the referendum a ´resounding 
failure´”21. As I metioned a few times before, the biggest problem Bolivia faces today is 
ideological. On the one hand, there is the believe in capitalism, in a Westernized state with a 
free market and unlimited possibilities for export, in which there is no fear of being ripped of 
like history told the Bolivians. A state in which the amount of land depends on your wealth 
and not if it´s fair to have it. To put it in Roberto Ruiz´s words, president of the Comité Cívico 
of Tarija: 
Bolivians have two options. One is to carry on thinking that we´ll always be ripped off, so it´s best 
not to do any deal at all in order that in 20 years´ time we can enjoy the doubtfull satisfaction of 
saying that nobody tricked us. We´ll be in the same pitiful poverty, staring at ourselfs like flies but, 
to be sure, unfleeced. The other option is to be proactive , establish clear rules and demand com-
pliance to ensure that the black history is not repeated… (Dunkerley, 2007).
19  ´Dreams and Realities´, Economist, 5/20/2006, Vol. 379, Issue 8478, p. 42-42, 1/2p.
20  ´A Revolution faces the voters´, Economist, 7/1/2006, Vol. 380, Issue 8484, pp. 33-34, 2p.
21  ´Battle by referendum, Economist´, 5/10/2008, Vol. 387, Issue 8579, p.48-48, 2/5p. 51
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On the other hand, there is the ideological part of Bolivia that rejects modernization as the 
globalised and Westernized world sees it. The part that admires the indigenous Wiphala flag, 
the flag of the seven colors of the rainbow, more that the Bolivian flag. Who believe in the state 
of Kollasuyo, the indigenous state, which 
is founded on indigenous customs, habits and community laws, which takes as its basis the Ayllu 
and totally rejects the structure of Western liberal democracy that involve economic liberalism, 
the dominance of market laws and private property. The Ayllu is structured around a system of 
community life where there is no money. Barter is used and community members are looked after 
following the principle of solidarity (Aguirre and Moreno,2007).
How can these different views cooperate in one and the same state? The worst part is that 
both ideoligical visions have extreme sides who are willing to fight for their believe. One is 
Felipe Quispe of Achacachi, in a speech, the other Branko Marinkovic, in an interview with 
New York Times:
Quispe:
´Rise up in arms, hunt down and judge the bosses… burn the houses of the rich and starve out the 
cities that oppress and exploit us… Only that which is native is good; the rest is rubbish´. (Dunker-
ley, 2007)
Marinkovic:
´A civil war would be economic suicide, giving my interests´ he said, explaining that his cooking oil, Acei-
te Rico, is sold throughout Bolivia and that a bank in which he owns a large stake, Banco Econó-
mico, has branches across the country. ´If there is no legitimate international mediation in our crisis, 
there is going to be confrontation´, he said. ´And unfortunately, it is going to be bloody and painful for all 
Bolivians´22
22  ´In Bolivia, a Croat and a Critic Is Cast in a Harsh Light´, New York Times.
  http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/27/world/americas/27bolivia.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all  <25-04-2009>52
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Why the example of the Spanish State of  3. 
Autonomies could work for Bolivia
Mentioning the regions of the ´media luna´ I tried not to use the word nationalism. The 
reason for this is that in my opinion there still is not something like a true Tarijeño or Cruceño 
notion of nationalism. Main reason for this is the absence of something like a sense of being 
part of a nation yet. If I use the definition of Enloe and Rejal, a nation would be: “a relatively 
large group of people who feel that they belong together by a virtue of sharing one or more 
such traits as common language, religion or race, common history or tradition, common set 
of customs, and common destiny” (Enloe & Rejal 1969). As I argued before, the ´media 
luna´ demanding autonomy is strictly ideological. Just like Catalonia and the Basque Country 
were for the Spanish state, the ´media luna´ is for the Bolivian state, economically, the most 
developed regions. Part of the nationalistic feelings in both the Basque Country and Catalonia 
depended on the economic interaction between region and state. This is exactly happening 
with the ´media luna´. Inhabitants have to fear for their wealth, land and way of life, the regions 
have enough sources of income to take care of themselves and therefore don´t need the state. 
In their vision, they are better of without being, totally, a part of the Bolivian state. This creates 
ideas, such as demanding autonomy.
Therefore, I believe that this could be the beginning of the development of a nationalism 
like the Basque one. There always existed something like a Basque history, there was a Basque 
identity, but it never turned into nationalistic feelings because people were statisfied with the 
state they were living in. This satisfaction changed over the years and therefore only one man 
could create the notion of a Basque nation within the Spanish state. Why wouldn’t this be 
possible for one of the regions of the ´media luna´? Eastern people look different from those 
living on the Altiplano, in the nineteenth century, because of the geographical obstacles, the 
different Bolivian regions created their own identity, tradition can be invented and there is a 
common destiny, namely, to get rid off of the social movements and establish a free market 
democracy. Nationalist feelings are just beginning in the ´media luna´. Santa Cruz, for 
example, was a small town in the 1950s, now it´s the economic center of Bolivia. Before there 
was no reason to demand something like autonomy. In contemporary Bolivia, the region feels 
the state is slowing down its development,  and therein finds a legitimacy to demand more 
competence to rule over its own territory. 53
Valentino Vondenhoff
Catalanism, and, into a lesser degree Basque nationalism developed over at least one 
and a half century. In the case of Catalonia, there have been various culturalist revivals and 
the development of a language that differs from that of the state. Both Basque and Catalan 
nationalism revived after the Franco period, after a period of suppression of nationalistic 
feelings. Out of this dictatorship arose the understanding of the Spanish State of Autonomies, 
through a notion of consensus between two opposing visions. Something similar happened 
in Bolivia after the military ´Six Year´ period. The years following the military regime have 
been the sole years of political stability in which political parties made pacts to be able to 
continue their structural reforms. In other words, through consensus. In this paper, I called 
the MAS government a government heading to a dictatorship. If this prediction comes true 
and history repeats itself than the worst part has yet to come for Bolivia. Those, who oppose 
the government´s vision will become more extreme. A, in my opinion, good solution for 
the Bolivian ´ideological problem´ would be to take the Spanish State of Autonomies as an 
example.
The Spanish State, after the Constitution of 1978, calls itself pluri-ethnic and assymetrical. 
To cite myself out of this paper: The pluri-ethnic and assymetrical characteristics are the 
consequence of the atmosphere of consensus in the beginning of the transition period. In 
fact, two different conceptions of Spain, which had traditionally confronted each other, were 
formulated. Subsequently, a middle-way was negotiated and explicitly recognized by the 
Constitution: the idea of an idivisible and solely Spanish nation-state, and a concept of Spain as 
an esemble of diverse peoples, historic nations, and regions. The reason why the Constitution 
cannot be considered as ´federal´ is because of the principle of ´interterritorial solidarity´ and 
explains the necessity to guarantee the integration and interrelation of the Spanis nationalities 
and regions. From a mundane point of view, the principle refers to the transfer of funds from 
the richer autonomous communities to the poorer, with the aim of attaining a minimum level 
of basic services state-wide with a fair and adequate distribution of the financial burden. 
Although Spain still has problems in solving the ´national question´, it became a stable 
democracy with a flourishing economy, in only thirthy-four years after the death of Franco. 
Seven years after Spain had begun its transition to democracy, Bolivia re-democratized. A 
Neo-liberal government was established, an experiment which ultimately failed. Extreme 
leftist movements seized power, by ruling from the streets. Only three and a half years after the 
formation of a leftist government, a part of the right is screaming for autonomy and proclaiming 
illegal Statutes of Autonomy. What Bolivia needs is a ‘café para todos´ just like the Spaniards 54
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did. Both ideologies have to admit some of their ideas. There should by a dialogue, just as 
in established democracies. Disputes should be fought in parliament and not on the streets. 
Media should give objective comment and not the comment the owner of the media want. 
To put it briefly, both ideologies should find a consensus over what is best for the country its 
future, if they don´t Bolivia will be facing some turbulent years ahead. 55
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